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LAW AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2020, America was once again required to confront its legacy of racial
inequality.1 Widely viewed videos of police violence against Black Americans, a
resurgent Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, 2 and racial disparities exposed
during the COVID-19 pandemic3 are motivating law school faculty and sociolegal
scholars to examine law’s role in perpetuating the ravages of racial bias.4 Research
reviewed in this article demonstrates that America’s legal system has long provided
an infrastructure for inequality between white and Black Americans. While racial
bias embedded in daily interactions should be a focus of close examination and
change, the behavior of individuals is learned, shaped, and guided by American
society’s public and private institutions, many of them founded in law.
The research we review shows that the legal system itself consists of interacting
organizations, role-players, and ideas that combine in patterns that contribute to
enduring racial inequality in other institutions as well as the legal system itself. The
recent COVID-19 pandemic’s well-documented impact on communities of color is a
direct effect of institutionalized racial inequality, the foundations of which are laid in

1.

See David Lopez, Foreword, The Great Pandemic and the Great Reckoning: Law and Society in an Emerging
World, 72 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 1265, 1289 (2020). Some of the important scholarship examining
sources of continuing racial inequality is reviewed in this article; its continuing presence in American
society has also been documented by numerous reports and publications by the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights. See, e.g., Memorandum from The Oklahoma Advisory Committee, U.S. Comm’n on
C.R., to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (June 2021) (on file with author) (focusing on racial
disparities in policing); U.S. Comm’n on C.R., Performance and Accountability Report (PAR)
for Fiscal Year 2020 (2020) (identifying COVID-19 as a catalyst for an increase in anti-Asian racism,
strained relations between police and Black Americans, and voting barriers).

2.

See generally Larry Buchanan et al., Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History (July
3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html.

3.

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) expressed concern about the national pattern of racial
inequality in access to medical care and treatment of COVID-19. See Health Equity Considerations and
Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups, CDC [hereinafter CDC Health Equity], https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html (Jan. 25, 2022). Local data also
highlighted specific regional patterns of racial inequality. See, e.g., COVID-19: Racial and Ethnic
Disparities, Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs., https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/covid-19/disparities.htm
(Jan. 20, 2022); COVID-19 Surveillance Data Update, Va. Dep’t of Health 16 (July 19, 2021);
Richard A. Oppel Jr. et al., The Fullest Look Yet at the Racial Inequity of Coronavirus (July 5, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/05/us/coronavirus-latinos-african-americans-cdc-data.
html.

4.

Recent law review symposia reflect these contemporary concerns about race. See, e.g., Symposium, 2021
Policing, Race, and Power, 73 Stan. L. Rev. Online 120 (2021) (co-hosted by Black Law Students
Association, Stanford); Symposium, From the Equal Rights Amendment to Black Lives Matter: Reflecting
on Intersectional Struggles for Equality, 107 Va. L. Rev. Online 1 (2021) (co-sponsored by Center for the
Study of Race and Law, UVA Law); Symposium, Structural Inequality & the Law, 69 UCLA L. Rev. 1
(2022); Symposium, Taking Our Space: Women of Color and Antiracism in Legal Academia, 73 Rutgers U.
L. Rev. 857 (2021).
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law documented in this research. Overcrowded housing,5 insecure employment,6 lower
income,7 poor health care,8 and untreated chronic illnesses (and resulting suspicion of
health care institutions),9 as well as racially-biased criminal justice,10 characterize
communities of color and are related to the role of law in our sordid history of race
relations. Outcomes such as a higher death rate from COVID-19 are to be expected
when such conditions exacerbate the risk of a fatal disease.11 Our review of research
reveals a remarkable truth: recent developments in our legal system, as well as its past
history, continue racial inequality just as racial inequality continues to shape our legal
system in ways that may not be immediately apparent but are carried forward by
mechanisms that shape the system today.12
Sources of racial inequality that are not immediate or transactional, meaning not
caused by implicit or intentional racial bias,13 are often lumped together as
“institutional” or “structural”—general terms for the patterns of organization and
interaction that persist from habit.14 Too little time has been given to examining the
invisible role of race in the construction of the legal framework of these ongoing
patterns sustaining racial inequality, namely, how they were created and how they
persist, much less to the cumulative effects of the multiple, interlocking institutions
created by law or the structures and the practices they sustain. Not only do these
ongoing institutional or structural patterns have roots in the past, but new
5.

See Leland B. Ware, Invisible Walls: An Examination of the Legal Strategy of the Restrictive Covenant
Cases, 67 Wash. U. L. Q. 737, 738–42 (1989) (explaining how the creation, upholding, and enforcement
of racial covenants proliferated the number of Black families in overcrowded, substandard housing).

6.

See generally Donna E. Young, Racial Releases, Involuntary Separations, and Employment At-Will, 34 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 351 (2001) (examining the racially disparate impact of America’s preferred “at-will” term
of employment).

7.

See Moritz Kuhn et al., Income and Wealth Inequality in America, 1949–2016, 9 Fed. Rsrv. Bank
Minneapolis 1, 4 (2018).

8.

See Courtney Connely, Racial Health Disparities Already Existed in America—The Coronavirus Just
Exacerbated Them, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/14/how-covid-19-exacerbated-americasracial-health-disparities.html (June 3, 2020).

9.

See Roberta Spalter-Roth et al., Race, Ethnicity, and the Health of Americans 2 (2005)
(“Racial prejudices and practices are institutionalized in this [healthcare] system and frequently result in
unequal access to medical care, unequal treatment for similar severity of illnesses and conditions, and
differences in heath [sic] insurance protection.”); René Bowser, Racial Bias in Medical Treatment, 105
Dick. L. Rev. 365, 372–74 (2001) (criticizing racialized research).

10.

See The Sentencing Project, Regarding Racial Disparities in the United States Criminal
Justice System 5–6 (2018).

11.

See CDC Health Equity, supra note 3.

12.

Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Race and the Law: The Visible and the Invisible, 66 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 141 (2021
–2022).

13.

See generally Guy A. Boysen & David L. Vogel, Bias in the Classroom: Types, Frequencies, and Responses,
36 Teach. of Psych. 12, 13 (2009) (“[I]mplicit bias tends to be subtle, automatic, and often occurs
without the perpetrator’s intention or awareness.”).

14.

For an article illustrating this mix of causes of racial inequality in the justice system, see Justin D.
Levinson & Robert J. Smith, Systemic Implicit Bias, 126 Yale L.J. F. 406 (2017).
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mechanisms that perpetuate and preserve racial bias and white dominance are also
being created.
Better understanding of the separate but interrelated mechanisms perpetuating
racial inequality in American society will enrich our efforts to change the direction
of our history, and this essay provides an introduction to recent research in the social
sciences that examines underlying sources of persistent inequality based on race.
II. MECHANISMS OF RACIAL INEQUALITY

Deep racial inequality persists in the United States more than fifty years after
the end of de jure segregation15 and passage of sweeping national civil rights
legislation.16 While changes have bettered the lives and opportunities for a fragile
Black middle-class,17 on average, Black Americans continue to experience the deep
historical legacies of racial division and structural inequality. Scholars have devoted
considerable effort to explaining the enduring entanglement between law, inequality,
and race by examining the impact of civil rights laws, mechanisms that carry forward
the legacy of racial division predating civil rights, and new sources of racial inequality.
At least two achievements of what we term the civil rights era—the culmination
of movements in the 1950s and 1960s leading to civil rights legislation—have
improved the landscape of racial equality. First is the expansion of the Black
American middle class through greater access to education, jobs, and housing;18 the
second is increasing access to the ballot, gained in no small part through the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).19 But both gains remain insecure. While the Black
American middle class has grown since the 1960s, its position is far more fragile
than that of whites.20 And while effective enforcement of the VRA, in part, led to
the changed demographic profile of elected officials at the local, state, and federal
level, 21 the Supreme Court recently held a key part of the VRA unconstitutional, 22
15.

See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (finding segregation in public education contrary
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee).

16.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. and 52 U.S.C.).

17.

See, e.g., William Lazonick et al., How the Disappearance of Unionized Jobs Obliterated an Emergent Black
Middle Class 7 (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 125, 2020).

18.

See generally Richard B. Freeman, Changes in the Labor Market for Black Americans, 1948–72, 1 Brookings
Papers on Econ. Activity 67 (1973).

19.

Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 52 U.S.C.); see also Richard O. Lempert & Joseph Sanders, An Invitation to Law and Social
Science 361–62 (1986) (examining the statutory structure that makes the VRA particularly effective).
In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court struck down section 4(b) of the VRA, which required
certain jurisdictions with a history of voter discrimination to receive preclearance from the federal
government before adopting new voting laws. 570 U.S. 529, 537–38, 557 (2013).

20. Freeman, supra note 18; see Pew Rsch. Ctr., The American Middle Class Is Losing Ground 22

(2015) [hereinafter The American Middle Class Is Losing Ground].

21.

See Joint Ctr. for Pol. & Econ. Stud., State of Race in Politics 24–34 (2015).

22.

See Shelby County., 570 U.S. at 550–51 (2013) (invalidating section 4(b)).
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allowing conservative state majorities to tailor voter access and redistricting laws to
weaken the power of Black American voters.23
Further, despite change and improvement for some Blacks, across most
dimensions of American society the landscape remains bleak. 24 Initial gains have
been slowed by failure to enforce civil rights laws25 and resistance to integration.
With the ending of the postwar economy and election in 1980 of a conservative
administration, gains for the working class in general, and Black Americans in
particular, came to an abrupt halt.26 Harsh changes in criminal justice have increased
racial inequality. Mass incarceration has become the most important determinant of
unequal opportunity for white and Black Americans, and since the 1960s, the chance
that a Black man will be incarcerated is one in four, significantly greater than his
chance of completing college.27
Not only have stark differences between whites and Blacks in income and wealth
remained almost unchanged since the 1970s, 28 but large numbers of Black Americans
continue to live in conditions of concentrated disadvantage.29 Only a few percent of
all white children born in the 1990s grew up in neighborhoods with 30 percent or
more living in poverty, a condition experienced by more than a third of all Black
Americans, the same proportion as the generation born in the 1970s.30 Unlike white
families, Black Americans have been unable to translate economic resources into
23.

Max Feldman, Voting Rights in America, Six Years After Shelby v. Holder, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (June
25, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/voting-rights-america-six-yearsafter-shelby-v-holder. For a nationwide look at changes in voter ID laws since 2000, see Voter ID
Chronology, Nat’l Conf. of State Legis. (Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/voter-id-chronology.aspx.

24.

The American Middle Class Is Losing Ground, supra note 20.

25.

Progressive groups have long criticized the lack of enforcement of federal civil rights laws. See generally
Citizens’ Comm’n on C.R., The Erosion of Rights 9 (William L. Taylor et al. eds., 2007). In Part V,
we describe research documenting a less visible mechanism undermining civil rights enforcement. See
infra pp. 197–200.

26. See Kevin Stainback & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Documenting Desegregation 157–59

(2012); see also Hadas Mandel & Moshe Semyonov, Going Back in Time? Gender Differences in Trends and
Sources of the Racial Pay Gap, 1970 to 2010, 81 Am. Socio. Rev. 1039, 1044, 1047–49 (2016).

27.

See Sara Wakefield & Christopher Wildeman, Children of the Prison Boom 13–15 (2013)
[hereinafter Children of Prison Boom]. But see E. Ann Carson, Bureau of Just. Stat., U.S. Dep’t
of Just., Prisoners in 2019, at 1, 9 (2020) (suggesting a more recent ratio of roughly one in forty-four
based on year-end 2019 statistics reporting “1,096 [B]lack prisoners [at the state and federal level] per
100,000 [B]lack residents”); see also Katharina Buchholz, Black Incarceration Rates Are Dropping in the
U.S., Statista (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.statista.com/chart/18376/us-incarceration-rates-by-sexand-race-ethnic-origin/ (estimating “one in 45” Black men per one hundred thousand Black residents
held in state or federal prison in 2019).

28. See Patrick Sharkey, Stuck in Place 2–3 (2013).
29. See infra note 171 (defining “concentrated disadvantage”); see also Etienne C. Toussaint, Of American

Fragility: Public Rituals, Human Rights, and the End of Invisible Man, 52 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.
826, 880 (2021) (same).

30. Sharkey, supra note 28; cf. Austin Nichols, Urb. Inst., Explaining Changes in Child Poverty

Over the Past Four Decades (2013).
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movement to better neighborhoods; consequently, “the same families have experienced
the consequences of life in the most disadvantaged environments over multiple
generations.”31
Research reviewed below shows that racial inequality has new sources and has
taken new forms in part because of economic globalization and massive immigration.
Among industrialized democracies, the United States alone has responded to
globalization by dismantling its economic safety net, allowing the minimum wage to
stagnate, failing to address economic dislocation caused by deindustrialization or the
increasing need for technical skills, and downsizing government employment.32 The
absence of government intervention has undermined the lives of both white and Black
working poor and unemployed, fueling racial resentment and backlash against civil
rights and, in turn, perpetuating a “legacy of race, which continues to divide poor,
working class, and middle class Americans from one another and deliver their political
support to politicians who serve the powerful, wealthy, and affluent.”33 Further,
perceptions of racial inequality have been altered by massive immigration adding
millions to a deeply divided low-wage labor force.34 This complex stream of immigrants,
some arriving with economic and educational advantages over Black Americans, has
placed racial inequality in a new light for both white and Black Americans.35
Research on these sources of racial inequality shows that the legal system
continues to be a major contributor to each of these persistent patterns. Indeed, law,
as a guarantor of social relationships and legitimate distribution of power, is
fundamental to systemic racism—racial bias that results from the ordinary
functioning of social systems and patterns of interaction that make up life in modern
America without explicit reference to race. Our review describes research on the
mechanisms by which law contributes to the persistence of racial inequality in the
most important areas of daily life. We begin with policymaking, a mechanism
fundamental to all the others. Part III describes three points of entry to examination
of the impact of policymaking on racial inequality—interest group influence, racial
formations and exogenous social and economic change.
Next, Part IV considers sociologist Douglas Massey’s conclusion that “two
structural configurations are central to perpetuating [B]lack disadvantages in the
31.

Sharkey, supra note 28; see Scott Winship et al., Brookings & Am. Enter. Inst., Long Shadows:
The Black-White Gap in Multigenerational Poverty 9 (2021); Bradley Hardy & Trevon Logan,
Race and the Lack of Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the United States, in Vision 2020 157, 161–63
(2020) (suggesting policies to promote intergenerational mobility).

32.

See generally Douglas S. Massey, Globalization and Inequality: Explaining American Exceptionalism, 25
Euro. Socio. Rev. 9, 11 (2009) [hereinafter Globalization and Inequality].

33.

Id. at 22.

34. See generally George Sanchez, Face the Nation: Race, Immigration, and the Rise of Nativism in Late Twentieth

Century America, 31 Int’l Migration Rev. 1009, 1019–21, 1025 (1997) (analyzing “antiforeign
sentiments” shared by many white and Black Americans); Martha Ross & Nicole Bateman,
Brookings, Meet the Low-Wage Workforce 9 (2019) (reporting that Latinos and Hispanics hold 25
percent of the low-wage workforce, and whites hold 52 percent).

35.

See infra note 96.
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post-civil rights era: the housing market and the criminal justice system.”36 Review of
recent scholarship on the second of these policy points, the impact of the criminal
justice system and mass incarceration on racial stratification, follows. Part V takes up
an issue closely related to both policymaking and criminal justice, the transformation
of law-on-the-books into law-in-action, using recent research on enforcement of civil
rights in employment as a case study. Part VI reviews research on the other
institutional configuration identified by Massey,37 the persistence of segregation and
concentrated neighborhood disadvantage. Part VII, our conclusion, returns to a
theme that deserves special emphasis: the need, above all at this moment in our
history, for scholarship and action by our colleagues and students that will change
the discourse, politics, and law perpetuating racial inequality and finish the fight for
civil rights.
III. RACE AND POLICYMAKING

An important field of research examines mechanisms by which race became, and
remains, a key factor in legislative action (and inaction). 38 Scholars conclude that
persistent entanglement between race and policymaking grows from a “deep
structure” of “race-framed conflict” in politics.39 We review three overlapping points
of entry by scholars who find evidence that racial biases infuse American political
institutions. The first of these grows from a long tradition of studying the relationship
between interest groups in American politics and the legislative strategies that
control agendas, distribution of power, and the structure of government itself.40 The
second point of entry uses a broader lens to find evidence of racial formations in
American politics that drive party agendas, political conflict, and the emergence of
new discourses about race and racial inequality.41 The third point of entry emphasizes
changes in the context of policymaking and implementation, especially sea changes
accompanying global and domestic upheaval, including the Great Depression, social
36. See Douglas S. Massey, Categorically Unequal 110 (2007) [hereinafter Categorically Unequal].
37.

Globalization and Inequality, supra note 32.

38. For many of the ideas elaborated here, we acknowledge our debt to Charles Epp’s insightful comments

on the importance of new policy studies in law and social sciences, which “focus on how public policies
are shaped by, and work to deepen, economic and racial inequalities.” See Charles R. Epp, Commentary
on Carroll Seron’s Presidential Address: Taking Policy Seriously, 50 Law & Soc’y Rev. 40 (2016) [hereinafter
Epp, Commentary].

39.

Id. at 42.

40. See infra Section III.A; see also, e.g., E. Pendleton Herring, The Brookings Inst., Group

Representation Before Congress 2–3 (1929) (democracy requires group organizing). This field of
study is well developed, but most of its research has been confined to the second half of the twentieth
century. See Daniel J. Tichenor & Richard A. Harris, Organized Interests and American Political
Development, 117 Pol. Sci. Q. 587, 588–89 (2003) (“To understand patterns and secular shifts in
interest group politics over time requires theory and data that are not overdetermined by the present.”).

41.

See infra Section III.B; see also Desmond S. King & Rogers M. Smith, Racial Orders in American Political
Development, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 75, 82–84 (2005) [hereinafter King & Smith 2005].
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movements and global leadership in the 1950s and 1960s, and later, deindustrialization,
economic globalization, and massive immigration.42
A. Race, Interest Group Politics, and Policymaking

Recent studies of the New Deal foundations of the American welfare state, the
pinnacle policy achievements of the civil rights era, and policy decisions in the era of
civil rights backlash and globalization, examine the critical role of interest groups
aligned with maintaining or reducing racial inequality. A comprehensive 2005 study
of the New Deal by Professor Ira Katznelson (the “Katznelson study”) asks, in the
years after World War II when key New Deal welfare victories remained in place
and Americans enjoyed unprecedented prosperity, why were Black Americans left
out?43 The study shows that three mechanisms employed by partisan interest groups,
principally a bloc of Southern congressmen, shaped the racial effects of New Deal
and Fair Deal legislation: First was the legislation’s provision of little-to-no benefits
and protections for work performed predominantly by Black Americans and Latinos
(for example, farm labor and domestic service); second was the delegation of
administrative control to local stakeholders with a known bias; and, ironically, third
was the absence of a mechanism for reviewing claims of discrimination.44 Further,
the Katznelson study shows that compromises engineered by the powerful Southern
bloc in Congress employed well-understood forms of federalism, allowing racially
biased local governmental authorities or union leaders to control actual benefits or
union protections of overtly race-neutral legislation.45 These compromises limited
access not only to safety net benefits but also to unions, higher education, and home
mortgages.46 In addition, they created barriers to accumulation of economic and
social capital that left multiple generations of Black Americans far behind whites in
wealth, education, and job security.47
Racial inequality persists in part because of the lasting political impact of the
New Deal’s racially biased labor protections. The New Deal’s failure to assure Black
Americans a place in the labor movement guaranteed that equal employment
legislation would become an important goal of the civil rights movement. It has been
argued that the political consequences of belated equalization of employment rights
have been enormous.48 Instead of granting whites and Blacks equal rights, the
42.

See infra Section III.C; see also Categorically Unequal, supra note 36 (arguing that social inequalities
stem from the universal human tendency to categorize others into various social groups).

43.

Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White (2005).

44. Id. at 38–41.
45.

Id.

46. See Ann Thomas, Foreword, Symposium 1999: Women, Equity and Federal Tax Policy: Open Questions, 16

N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1 (1999) (detailing the racial impact of Internal Revenue Code mortgage policies).

47.

Katznelson, supra note 43, at 162–66 (2005); Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law 177–93
(2017).

48. See Paul Frymer, Black and Blue 99 (2008).
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separate protections of the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 seemed to pit taken-for-granted labor rights of the white working
class against the civil rights of Black Americans.49 As deindustrialization and global
competition ended American economic expansion, 50 conservatives recruited
disillusioned white workers, turning them against the Civil Rights Act and other
civil rights laws that were characterized as unfairly benefiting Black Americans and
their Democratic Party sponsors.51
Other research has argued that, just as the Southern Democratic bloc left its mark
on New Deal and Fair Deal legislation, entrenched political interests weakened major
civil rights laws enacted in the 1960s.52 Comparison of the enforcement powers
granted federal agencies by Title VII, the VRA, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968
(FHA)53 revealed the power of key members of Congress and the executive branch
who paid lip service to civil rights while channeling the reservations of white
majorities.54 Their preferences carried extra weight during negotiations that crippled
Title VII and the FHA, but not the VRA.55 The agencies charged with enforcing the
49. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169; Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17.

50. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Changing Workplace as a Locus of Integration in a Diverse Society, 2000

Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 331, 349–50 (2000) (highlighting the impact felt by the labor force post-New
Deal due to a decline in industrialization and an increase in global competition).

51.

Desmond S. King & Rogers M. Smith, Strange Bedfellows? Polarized Politics? The Quest for Racial Equity
in Contemporary America, 61 Pol. Rsch. Q. 686, 690–92 (2008) [hereinafter King & Smith 2008].

52.

See, e.g., Nicholas Pedriana & Robin Stryker, From Legal Doctrine to Social Transformation? Comparing
U.S. Voting Rights, Equal Employment Opportunity, and Fair Housing Legislation, 123 Am. J. Socio. 86,
127 (2017) [hereinafter From Legal Doctrine to Social Transformation?] (citations omitted) (“[Our
research] reminds us how much law, courts, and civil and political rights figured in constructing the
contours and exceptionalism of a U.S. welfare state in which regulatory and social policies are deeply
intertwined, and the politics of race is fundamental.”); Lauren B. Edelman, Working Law 11 (2016)
[hereinafter Working Law] (discussing how civil rights policies have “coexisted with discriminatory
practices and cultures” in a way that weakens existing civil rights laws); Sean Farhang, The Political
Development of Job Discrimination Litigation, 1963–1976, 23 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 23, 24–25 (2009)
(describing how Congress wrote civil rights statutes that rely on private rather than public enforcement
to avoid political backlash); John David Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action 20–22
(1996) (analyzing right-leaning resistance to affirmative action between 1964 and 1971); Lauren B.
Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures, 97 Am. J. Socio. 1531, 1533 (1992) [hereinafter Legal
Ambiguity] (noting critics who argue that social reform laws give the appearance of change but operate
to preserve the status quo).

53.

Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (enforcement powers to EEOC), with Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 3, 52
U.S.C. § 10302 (enforcement powers to U.S. attorney general), and Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 808, 42
U.S.C. § 3608 (enforcement powers to HUD secretary).

54. From Legal Doctrine to Social Transformation?, supra note 52, at 128.
55.

E.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New
Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1417, 1438 (2003)
(describing Senate and House efforts to limit the scope of enforcement powers granted by Title VII).
[Amendments offered to Title VII by Republican congressional leaders] dramatically
limited the enforcement powers of the [EEOC] . . . ; deleted the authority of a
nongovernmental group, such as the [NAACP], to sue on behalf of a protected worker;
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first two acts, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), emerged from committee
negotiations with conservative white congressmen with power to conciliate and
process complaints but lacked power to enforce, reducing their work in the words of
one scholar, to a “fiasco.”56
Title VII also became a robust source of protection for employment rights in the
1970s through interpretation by a sympathetic federal judiciary.57 Persuaded to adopt
a broad “group-centered effects” construction of ambiguous statutory language,58 the
courts stretched Title VII to permit plaintiffs to show evidence of “systemic group
disadvantage rather than individual harm, discriminatory consequences rather than
discriminatory intent, and substantive, remedial group results rather than formal
procedural justice.”59 Following President Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, the will
of the Department of Justice to pursue “group-centered” class actions disappeared,
and the EEOC deemphasized systemic enforcement in favor of the statute’s original,
compromised legislative mandate to resolve individual complaints. 60 FHA
enforcement was similarly weakened by statutory language, and even after
amendments strengthened HUD’s enforcement power, it never became a force for
structural change.61
The VRA, enacted in 1965 as a brutal struggle for voting rights in Selma,
Alabama, and other southern cities played out on nightly television, expressly
incorporated “group-centered” language mandating preclearance of voting practices
[and added] several other procedural rules . . . that would make it more difficult to
enforce the antidiscrimination prohibitions of the Act.

Id. at 1471–72.

56. See sources cited supra note 52.
57.

Nicholas Pedriana & Robin Stryker, The Strength of a Weak Agency: Enforcement of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and the Expansion of State Capacity, 1965–1971, 110 Am. J. Socio. 709, 717 (2004);
Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, Quiet Revolution in the South 35 (1994); Lempert
& Sanders, supra note 19, at 378–85 (contextualizing the sympathetic federal judiciary).

58. The language which the courts found ambiguous, and therefore subject to a broad “group-effects”

interpretation, is found in section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which does not mention
intent but refers to discrimination “because of ” race—language that could but need not be construed as
requiring proof of intentional discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The major differences between
the standards of culpability to be applied by the courts enforcing Title VII and the VRA came from
language in Title VII, which emphasized the importance of intent, and a parallel provision in the VRA,
which required use of an effects test. See From Legal Doctrine to Social Transformation?, supra note 52, at
102–05.

59.

From Legal Doctrine to Social Transformation?, supra note 52, at 88. The Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., for example, construed Title VII as requiring proof of discriminatory impact, not discriminatory
intent. 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971).

60. See Spencer Rich, Reagan Panel, Citing ‘New Racism,’ Urges Easing of EEOC Rules, Wash. Post (Jan.

30, 1981), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/01/30/reagan-panel-citing-newracism-urges-easing-of-eeoc-rules/dfd79721-7bbc-4ef0-91a3-ee5425904abe/.

61.

Sharkey, supra note 28, at 53.
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that could potentially impede Black American voting.62 A strong public consensus
behind voting rights prevailed over southern and conservative reservations in part
because the act required preclearance by southern but few northern states.63 Until the
Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder64 rendering preclearance
inoperable, the VRA had been uniquely effective civil rights legislation.65
These studies of the legislative process demonstrate the pervasive influence of
key interest groups which expect to gain or lose from changes in racial hierarchy.
Although few studies provide similarly detailed documentation of interest group
influence on enactment and enforcement of thousands of state and local laws that
complement federal legislation on the basic structure of the welfare state and civil
rights, there is little doubt that interest group dynamics prevail at every level.
Subsequent parts of this review consider studies which describe the role of important
types of local policymaking on racial inequality, including criminal justice
enforcement, regulation of employment, and local zoning and housing policies.
B. Racial Formation

Theories of “racial formation” provide an explanation for the pervasive presence
of racial hierarchy in ideologies maintaining major political coalitions.66 According
to these theories, in every generation, gaining political power in America has required
recruitment of, among others, actors invested in preserving or reducing white
advantage maintaining a preexisting institutional order (bureaucracies, Congress,
established non-state actors) that perpetuates the racial politics of prior eras. Two
racial orders have always been present, if not always in balance: one promoting or
maintaining white advantage, and another allied with those who oppose it.67
62. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2006), invalidated by Shelby County v. Holder,

570 U.S. 529 (2013) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10303); see also Richard M. Valelly, The Two
Reconstructions 4 (2004).

63. Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-

previously-covered-section-5 (last visited Apr. 30, 2022).

64. 570 U.S. at 557.
65.

Id. (“The [VRA] has proved immensely successful at redressing racial discrimination and integrating
the voting process.”); Grofman & Davidson, supra note 57.

66. Nearly three decades ago, inf luential scholars Michael Omi and Howard Winant defined “racial

formation” as the “sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed,
and destroyed,” attributing the embedding of race in American politics to the “racial projects” of American
elites who led social movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Michael Omi & Howard Winant, Racial
Formation in the United States 55 (1994). Refining and extending Omi and Winant’s concept,
Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith argue that the formation of “racial orders”—political coalitions
bound together by racial commitments—provide a “framework for organiz[ing] empirical evidence of the
extent and manner in which structures of racial inequalities have been interwoven with economic as well
as gender and religious hierarchies and social institutions.” King & Smith 2005, supra note 41.

67.

King and Smith provide a synthesis of mainstream political science and racial orders research, and we
summarize their analysis in this section discussing racial formation. King & Smith 2005, supra note 41,
at 3–10.
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While political coalition members may have varied motives, they must sign on to
a common agenda to keep the coalition together, an agenda that necessarily
accommodates maintaining or reducing a legacy of white advantage.68 Racial orders69
explain the influence of race not only on legislation with an explicit racial impact,
but also on the vast array of non-racial government policies and practices which
“have never developed apart from pressures to alter or maintain the nation’s racial
ordering.”70 Similarly, battles over racial hierarchies pervasively influence government
agency practices such as program administration, hiring, promotion, and
unionization.71
Social movements in the 1970s and 1980s, led by conservative political
entrepreneurs, placed political representatives at every level72 supporting legislation
that contributed to sharply rising levels of economic inequality, minimization of
welfare state benefits for the working class,73 and severe reductions in protection for
civil rights.74 The new discourse of resistance to affirmative action created by “active
and conscious rhetorical construction of conservatives” avoided “hot rhetoric” that
invoked racial status directly.75 Opposition to affirmative action was framed as
“colorblind” resistance to racial discrimination by the government, thus embracing
racial equality while denying government authority to intervene to redress benefits of

68. Frymer, supra note 48, complements arguments made by Katznelson, supra note 43, in arguing that

conflict over race has been “embedded in institutions . . . that promote rules and sources which in turn
make appeals to racism a politically inviting strategy.” See also Michael Tesler, Post-Racial or
Most-Racial? 30, 34–35 (2016).

69. “The ‘racial orders’ thesis rejects claims that racial injustices are aberrations in America, for it elaborates

how the nation has been pervasively constituted by systems of racial hierarchy since its inception.” King
& Smith 2005, supra note 41, at 75, 78 (using the racial orders concept to expose race in U.S. politics).

70. Id. at 84.
71.

See Sungjoo Choi & Hal G. Rainey, Managing Diversity in U.S. Federal Agencies: Effects of Diversity and
Diversity Management on Employee Perceptions of Organizational Performance, 70 Pub. Admin. Rev. 109,
116 (2010).

72. E.g., John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers for Conservative Causes: Clients, Ideology, and Social Distance, 37 Law

& Soc. Rev. 5, 34–35 (2003); Ann Southworth, Lawyers of the Right 14–18, 23–25 (2008)
(noting that lawyers from conservative public interest firms worked for the Reagan administration);
Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement 389–422 (2010) (describing
the making of the Federalist Society and its network of conservative lawyers).

73. See “policy context” discussion infra Section III.C.
74.

See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow 40 (2010) (“Proponents of racial hierarchy found they
could install a new racial caste system without violating the law or the new limits of acceptable political
discourse, by demanding ‘law and order’ rather than ‘segregation forever.’”); Marie Gottschalk, The
Prison and the Gallows (2006) [hereinafter Prison and Gallows] (questioning the absence of
public opposition to an expanding carceral state).

75. Julie Novkov, Rethinking Race in American Politics, 61 Pol. Rsch. Q. 649, 655 (2008); Daniel Martinez-

HoSang, The Triumph of Racial Liberalism, The Demise of Racial Justice, in Race and American
Political Development 288, 296, 306–07 (Joseph E. Lowndes et al. eds., 2008).
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past racial subordination.76 “Colorblind” policy advocacy draws support from and in
turn legitimizes “symbolic racism,” a stereotype shared by a significant proportion of
whites that Black Americans themselves are to blame for inequality because they do
not value education, work, or marriage.77
In addition to increased opposition to equality-enhancing legislation, widespread
anti-government sentiment has also increased support for “colorblind” policies on
punitive welfare and crime control.78 Policy “drift” through legislative inaction must
also be understood as a choice reflecting costs and benefits to key political interests.79
Failure to maintain the minimum wage or welfare benefits notwithstanding rising
need or inflation has disadvantaged disproportionate numbers of Black Americans.80
Such choices, a leading scholar observes, are the “legacy of race, which continues to
divide poor, working class, and middle class Americans from one another and deliver
their political support to politicians who serve the powerful, wealthy, and affluent.”81
Perhaps the most important bellwether of the new racial order is the Supreme
Court, an institution regarded as the bulwark of constitutionalism and American
76. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Our Constitution is

color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).

77.

See Howard Schuman et al., Racial Attitudes in America 293–96 (rev. ed. 1997) (defining
“symbolic racism” as a blend of values and morals that Blacks were said to be violating); David O. Sears
& P.J. Henry, Over Thirty Years Later: A Contemporary Look at Symbolic Racism, 37 Advances
Experimental Soc. Psych. 95, 98–101 (2005) (“[S]ymbolic racism [i]s one of the most widely used
measures of explicit racism today.”); Donald R. Kinder & Cindy D. Kam, Us Against Them 47–48
(2009) (describing racial stereotypes as an ethnocentric belief within white culture); Lawrence D. Bobo
& Camille Z. Charles, Race in the American Mind: From the Moynihan Report to the Obama Candidacy,
621 ANNALS Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 243, 245–47 (2009) (highlighting the negative racial
stereotypes subscribed to by a “substantial portion of the white population”).

78. See Carol J. Greenhouse, Life Stories, Law’s Stories: Subjectivity and Responsibility in the Politicization of

the Discourse of “Identity,” 31 Pol. & Legal Anthro. Rev. 79, 80 (2008); Martin Gilens, Why
Americans Hate Welfare 3–4, 182–85 (1999).

79. “Policy drift is the problem of policies remaining in place even as evolving conditions justify updating

and fine-tuning those policies—with the result running contrary to the interests of most in the country.”
David Kamin, Legislating for Good Times and Bad, 54 Harv. J. Legis. 202, 203–04 (2017) (footnote
omitted).
Failure on the part of Congress to refine section 5 of the VRA, which “required States to obtain
federal permission before enacting any law related to voting—a drastic departure from basic principles
of federalism,” in the aftermath of Shelby County is an important example of “policy drift.” Voting
Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c; 570 U.S. 529, 535 (2013) (limiting its holding to section 4(b)
of the VRA without ruling on section 5); see also Angelica Rolong, Access Denied: Why the Supreme
Court’s Decision in Shelby County v. Holder May Disenfranchise Texas Minority Voters, 46 Tex. Tech. L.
Rev. 519, 552–53 (2014).

80. See Epp, Commentary, supra note 38, at 42–43; see also Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-

Take-All Politics 117–18 (2010) [hereinafter Winner-Take-All Politics].

81.

Globalization and Inequality, supra note 32, at 22; see also Chuck Collins et al., Inst. for Pol’y
Stud., Ten Solutions to Bridge the Racial Wealth Divide 11 (2019) (citing “slavery, Jim Crow,
red lining, [and] mass incarceration” as factors contributing to the racial wealth gap). For more on the
racial wealth gap, see Ann F. Thomas, The Racial Wealth Gap and the Tax Benefits of Homeownership, 66
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 247, 249–55 (2021–2022); and on policy context, see infra Section III.C.
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political values.82 Far from defending the vision of Brown v. Board of Education,83
recent conservative majorities of the Court have channeled skepticism characteristic
of the new racial order, by embracing “colorblindness” while severely limiting
possibilities for affirmative action and thereby expressing concern that otherwise
undeserving groups might gain unfair advantage.84 In 1989, the Court’s apparent
indifference to the effects of a long history of pervasive discrimination caused
dissenting Justice Thurgood Marshall to remark that “a majority of th[e] Court
signals that it regards racial discrimination as largely a phenomenon of the past.”85
C. Policy Context

Studies of the relationship between race, political structure, and policy show the
powerful influence of changes in the domestic or international social and economic
order, which we call “policy context.”86 New Deal origins of a racially divided welfare
state cannot be separated from the economic upheaval accompanying the Great
Depression. Likewise, the post-World War II civil rights era depended on support
from a working class benefiting from an expanding economy and elite concern about
the legitimacy of America’s claim to global leadership. Post-World War II global and
domestic priorities created conditions favorable to Brown’s epistemic break with Jim
Crow and de jure segregation, and an opening for civil rights legislation.
A decade later, economic globalization and massive immigration contributed to a
very different context for interest group strategies, racial formation, and realization
of Brown’s mandate. Included in these contributory factors was deindustrialization

82. For further examination of racial bias in Supreme Court jurisprudence, see Purcell, supra note 12.
83. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting racial segregation in public schools).
84. Compare id. at 493–95 (finding racially segregated schools “inherently unequal” and violative of the

Equal Protection Clause), with Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (subjecting all race-based classifications, remedial or not, to strict scrutiny), and Parents
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 747–48 (2007) (plurality opinion) (“The
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”).

85. Richmond, 488 U.S. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Since 1976, the Court has typically required plaintiffs

to prove discrimination claims with evidence of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976) (“[T]he basic equal protection principle [is] that the invidious quality of a law
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”).
		Doris Marie Provine comments that the Court thus ignores complexities of racialized fears and
misperceptions, implicit bias, and institutional rules that encourage people to act in racially
discriminatory ways. Doris Marie Provine, Unequal Under Law 10 (2007); see also Kristin A. Lane
et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 427, 435–47 (2007); Margaret
Richardson & Todd L. Pittinsky, The Mistaken Assumption of Intentionality in Equal Protection Law:
Psychological Science and the Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 2–3 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of
Gov’t, Harv. Univ., Working Paper No. RWP05-011, 2005). For a contrasting statutory ruling
considering whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA, see Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. 519 (2015).
86. Globalization and Inequality, supra note 32; King & Smith 2005, supra note 41.
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beginning as early as the 1960s,87 further job losses following the oil crisis in 1973,88
and growing competition from minorities—initially Black Americans migrating
from the South to urban centers in the North in the 1950s and 1960s.
More recently, massive numbers of immigrants created backlash and an
opportunity for the conservative realignment that absorbed a large part of a white
working class and other moderates opposed to further government intervention. The
new coalition has supported reversal of years of progress in reducing racial disparity
in school quality, employment security, and advantages of economic and cultural
capital possessed by whites in seeking higher education.89 This new alignment favors
“colorblind” policies that oppose affirmative action and welfare but, ironically, also
policies favoring the wealthy who control the new legislative coalition.90
Policies that affect inequality are no longer organized expressly along lines of race
but along lines of class, creating competition between racial minorities and poorer
white men.91 Black American interests are represented in legislative battles by what is
now a losing political coalition. The winners are the wealthy, supported by those they
have recruited with the help of globalization and deindustrialization to oppose
regulatory intervention and government spending.92 But the coalition also supports
tax breaks and subsidies for the wealthiest,93 leaving poor whites and especially Black
Americans, already disadvantaged by a vast wealth divide, further behind.94
87.

See Barry Bluestone & Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America 4, 6 (1982).
For a graphic representation, see Paul Krugman, Trade and the Decline of U.S. Manufacturing Employment,
N.Y. Times (May 19, 2015), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/05/19/trade-and-the-declineof-us-manufacturing-employment/.

88. John F. Early, Effect of the Energy Crisis on Employment, 97 Monthly Lab. Rev. 8, 10–11 (1974) (tying

380,000 job losses between November 1973 and March 1974 to the oil crisis). An oil embargo was
instituted against the United States by oil-exporting countries after the U.S. government provided
emergency war aid to Israel. Michael Corbett, Oil Shock of 1973–74, Fed. Rsrv. Hist. (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/oil-shock-of-1973-74.

89. See Globalization and Inequality, supra note 32 (noting the impact of reduced social funding on the

working class and working poor). These themes come together around the policy domain of the carceral
state, to which we turn in Part IV.

90. King & Smith 2005, supra note 41, at 83; see discussion supra note 66.
91.

Globalization and Inequality, supra note 32.

92.

See Winner-Take-All Politics, supra note 80, at 77–79.

93.

Id. at 50; see also Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century 451 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., Harv. Univ. Press 2014) (studying global economic and social patterns affecting accumulation and
distribution of wealth); Globalization and Inequality, supra note 32 (contending that progressive taxation
policies were restructured to shift the tax burden from rich to poor). But see Suzanne Mettler, The
Submerged State 33 (2011) (citing tax breaks benefitting the working poor).

94. See David Jacobs & Jonathan C. Dirlam, Politics and Economic Stratification: Power Resources and Income

Inequality in the United States, 122 Am. J. Socio. 469, 475 (2016) (citing Melvin Oliver & Thomas
Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth (2006)) (“African-Americans (and probably Hispanics)
have not accrued nearly as much personal wealth as whites.”); Douglas S. Massey & Robert J. Sampson,
Moynihan Redux: Legacies and Lessons, 621 ANNALS Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 6, 6 (2009)
(criticizing economic policy rewritten to benefit the wealthy over the working class).
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Race-neutral deregulation in the era of free market globalization has not only
increased the economic disadvantages of the poor, a group that is disproportionately
Black American,95 but has also disproportionately destabilized the Black American
middle class96 by reducing government employment,97 deregulating the mortgage
market,98 ending enforcement of school desegregation,99 and encouraging segregated
housing markets.100
Immigration policy illustrates the pervasive influence of policy context on interest
group strategies and racial formation.101 Influential organizations in the dominant
political coalition of the 1960s which opposed racial stereotyping, including the
NAACP and its allies, together with elites influenced by the Cold War, supported
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA). The act, for the first time in a
century, opened the door to immigration from Asia, Latin America, and later,
Africa.102 Subsequently, massive immigration linked to globalization, especially from
Asia and Latin America, shifted the racial and ethnic profile of the United States.103
This shift fostered new “discourses about the ‘new immigrants’ . . . that perpetuate
stereotyped notions of racial identities,”104 often to the disadvantage of Black
95. Emily A. Shrider et al., U.S. Census Bureau, Income and Poverty in the United States:

2020, at 15 fig.9 (2021) (charting a 19.5 percent poverty rate for Blacks, 17 percent for Hispanics, 8.2
percent for white non-Hispanics, and 8.1 percent for Asian Americans).

96. The American Middle Class Is Losing Ground, supra note 20, at 13; Sharkey, supra note 28

(arguing that there has not been a meaningful expansion of the Black middle class); see generally George
Wilson & Ian Sakura-Lemessy, Earnings Over the Early Work Career Among Males in the Middle Class:
Has Race Declined in its Significance?, 43 Socio. Persps. 159 (2000) (comparing earnings of white and
Black middle-class males between 1975 and 1982 and then 1985 and 1992).

97.

Globalization and Inequality, supra note 32.

98. Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, 75

Am. Socio. Rev. 629, 632 (2010) (first citing Paul Langley, Sub-prime Mortgage Lending: A Cultural
Economy, 37 Econ. & Soc’y 469 (2008); then citing Paul Langley, Debt, Discipline, and Government:
Foreclosure and Forbearance in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 41 Env’t & Plan. 1404 (2009); and then
citing Guy Stuart, Discriminating Risk (Cornell Univ. Press 2003)).

Id.

[L]ucrative subprime lending and securitization practices did not suddenly appear ‘at
the fringes of finance,’ but were produced and legitimated by the financial industry
using new, high-tech tools such as credit scoring, risk-based pricing, securitization,
credit default swaps, and variable rate mortgages that were billed as rational, scientific,
and safe.

99. Charles T. Clotfelter, After Brown 39 (2004).
100. Categorically Unequal, supra note 36, at 158.
101. Lenni B. Benson, Seeing Immigration and Structural Racism: It’s Where You Put Your Eyes, 66 N.Y.L. Sch.

L. Rev. 277 (2021–2022).

102. See Henry Yu, Thinking Orientals 1, 6, 152 (2001).
103. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, 2020 Census Statistics Highlight Local Population Changes

and Nation’s Racial and Ethnic Diversity (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2021/population-changes-nations-diversity.html.

104. King & Smith 2005, supra note 41, at 89.
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Americans.105 In turn, new immigrants who wish to support certain policy choices
must engage in what one scholar refers to as “racial triangulation,” which requires
them to choose sides in debates dominated by Black-versus-white distinctions or bear
the burden of distinguishing themselves from both sides of this polarized perception
of race.106
All policy regimes have consequences for racial inequality. Policy that perpetuates
inequality is an outcome of interest group agendas and legislative strategies, racial
formations created by political coalition building, and significant change in policy
context—currently, globalization, deindustrialization, and massive immigration.
Each explanation illuminates the formation of policy goals, distributive outcomes,
and racial stereotypes that allow them to go unchallenged. Going forward, law and
social science scholars have an opportunity to draw on these strands of theory and
research to suggest better explanations of outcomes and more promising ways to
reduce inequality.
IV. THE CARCERAL STATE

The consolidation of the carceral state, including the growth of incarceration in
state prisons and county jails since the 1970s, disproportionately affects communities
of color and has become the most important policy sustaining racial inequality in the
post-civil rights era. Here, we highlight three bodies of scholarship. First, we review
research that builds on new policy studies to unpack the politics behind the expansion
of the carceral state. Next, we review an emerging body of research that focuses on
the oft-unrecognized connections between the census and incarceration. Finally, we
review the literature on mass incarceration as a mechanism of stratification and its
collateral consequences.107
A. The Politics of the Carceral State

The contemporary policy of incarceration has deep roots in American political
development that long predate the massive buildout of prisons beginning in the
1970s.108 Crime policy is, moreover, deeply entwined with a strong federalist
105. Categorically Unequal, supra note 36; see, e.g., Katherine S. Newman, No Shame in My Game

39–40 (1999); Philip Kasinitz & Jan Rosenberg, Missing the Connection: Social Isolation and Employment
on the Brooklyn Waterfront, 43 Soc. Probs. 180, 193–94 (1996).

106. Claire Jean Kim, The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans, 27 Pol. & Soc’y 105, 107 (1999); Tesler,

supra note 68, at 30–31.

107. For related discussion, see Lynn Su, Unpacking the Teaching Potential of a Hypothetical Criminal Case

Involving a Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification, 66 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 339 (2021–2022).

108. See generally Prison and Gallows, supra note 74, at 29 (adding that certain industries have reaped

financial reward from the prison-building boom); Bert Useem & Anne Morrison Piehl, Prison
State 41–43 (2008) (tying Black incarceration rates to the removal of industry from cities in the 1970s);
Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment 16–17 (2009) (citing increasing crime as a basis for
penal policy change); David Garland, The Culture of Control 116 (2001) (summarizing the
commercialization of penal institutions and the U.S. criminal justice system). Scholars have also
recognized a shift from rehabilitative policy:
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tradition, with notable historical variations among states and regions of the country.109
Despite these differences, by the late 1970s every state in the country was building
more prisons.110 An important body of research explores reasons for this policy
convergence around incarceration and whether fundamental reform is feasible.
Research has shown that the policies of the civil rights movement and its progeny
were met with significant, strident, and sophisticated backlash that is deeply
embedded in a historical legacy of “racial hierarchy that deems Black Americans
mostly responsible for their situation.”111 A politics of law and order coupled with
anti-Black sentiment is rarely far beneath the surface in American politics—and
often bipartisan.112 Across the South and among white working-class citizens in the
North, civil rights reforms were often linked to a fear of crime and lawlessness.113
Such rhetoric was a critical factor in laying the foundation for reforms in crimerelated policies, including sentencing, victims’ rights, prison litigation, and policing.114
Almost concurrent with the start of the imprisonment boom was a notable break with
the underlying rationale for the penal institution itself. As a number of observers have
pointed out, during the 1970s, faith in the rehabilitative ideal that had prevailed in
penology for the past century began to erode among criminal justice practitioners,
academics, and policymakers.

Mona Lynch, Sunbelt Justice 2 (2009) (first citing Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the
Rehabilitative Ideal (Yale Univ. Press 1981); then citing David Garland, The Culture of
Control (2001); and then citing Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, 36 Pub. Int. 22 (1974)).
109. See Lisa L. Miller, The Perils of Federalism (2008).
110. Cf. Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, The Atlantic (Dec. 1998), https://www.theatlantic.

com/magazine/archive/1998/12/the-prison-industrial-complex/304669/ (reporting roughly one
thousand new prisons and jails built between the late 1970s and 1990s).

111. Doris Marie Provine, Race and Inequality in the War on Drugs, 7 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 41, 50 (2011);

see also Alexander, supra note 74, at 11 (“Mass incarceration . . . is the most damaging manifestation of
the backlash against the Civil Rights Movement.”); Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, After the “Master
Theory”: Downs, Schattschneider, and the Rebirth of Policy-Focused Analysis, 12 Persps. on Pol. 643, 651–52
(2014) [hereinafter Master Theory] (discussing the long history of racial hierarchies in the United States).

112. See Prison and Gallows, supra note 74, at 6, 15, 34.
113. Michael C. Campbell & Heather Schoenfeld, The Transformation of America’s Penal Order: A Historicized

Political Sociology of Punishment, 118 Am. J. Socio. 1375, 1390 (2013) (describing “law and order”
rhetoric of politicians in the 1960s and 1970s); see also Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the
Development of Punitive Crime Policy, 21 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 230, 242 (2007) (recounting common
congressional debates as to whether “civil rights would engender a crime wave and integration would
bring lawlessness”).

114. For example, Campbell & Schoenfeld, supra note 113, at 1377, maps state-level policies that resulted in

prison expansion and, with it, the mass incarceration of Black Americans and Hispanics, particularly
men; it also demonstrates the ways in which historical legacies and political mechanisms coalesce
around a policy regime that arguably resulted in a politics of “governing through crime.” See also
Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime 4–7, 18–20 (2007); Garland, supra note 108, at
27–29, 168–171, 194.
Drawn from comparative case studies of eight states in different regions, Campbell & Schoenfeld,
supra note 113, at 1377, found that, over time, national political competition, federal crime control policy,
and federal court decisions helped create state-level political innovation and special interest groups that
pushed lawmakers to increasingly define the crime problem as a lack of punishment and to choose policy
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Research also documents recent attempts to challenge the politics of the carceral
state.115 After nearly twenty years of litigation, in 2013 the Supreme Court held in
Brown v. Plata that the conditions of confinement in California’s prisons violated the
Eighth Amendment,116 and ordered the state to reduce the prison population by
approximately thirty thousand inmates, to 137.5 percent of design capacity.117 The
Public Safety Realignment Act118 (the “California Experiment”) is designed to
downsize the state’s prison population through county-supported programs that
return non-violent, non-sexual, non-serious prisoners to local supervision.119
Implementation of the reform is left to the county innovations which may range from
increasing the capacity of jails to rehabilitation in what has been described as one of
“the biggest penal experiment[s] in American incarceration policy.”120 The California
Experiment in prison downsizing, along with other reforms, such as reentry
programs, have engendered the most recent turn in the debate around the carceral
state. Analysis of the impact of the experiment suggests that we should remain
skeptical about the impact of the Supreme Court’s Plata decision. Innovative reentry
strategies to tackle recidivism and stronger political support may help, but progress
will be impeded by contemporary “pathologies that run through the carceral state
[and] also run through American politics,” including neoliberalism, globalization,
immigration, deindustrialization, and policies creating significant structural
solutions that put more people in prison for longer periods of time. Id.; see also, e.g., Prison and Gallows,
supra note 74 (discussing prison growth and sentencing); Marie Gottschalk, Caught 1–2 (2015)
[hereinafter Caught] (same); David Jacobs & Aubrey L. Jackson, On the Politics of Imprisonments: A
Review of Systematic Findings, 6 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 129 (2010) (describing “political appeals” for
law and order); Michelle Phelps, Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality in
U.S. Prison Programs, 45 Law & Soc’y Rev. 33 (2011) (envisaging prison downsizing).
115. Despite the ways in which the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA) undermined potentially

impactful case law, prisoner rights advocates in California leveraged a unique set of resources to
challenge the conditions of confinement in the state’s prisons. See generally Margo Schlanger, The Just
Barely Sustainable California Prisoners’ Rights Ecosystem, 664 ANNALS Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 62,
71–73 (2016) (advocating for prisoners’ rights via resources in the public interest sector).

116. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments

inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

117. 563 U.S. 493, 501, 525 (2011) (describing the conditions of confinement in issue as an interrelated

“spider web” resulting from overcrowding, which contributed to inadequate prisoner healthcare).

118. Assemb. B. 109, 2011–12 Leg. (Cal. 2011).
119. Revisions to the California Experiment focus on reducing California’s prison population and its

corrections budget. See Pub. Safety Realignment Act of 2011 Implementation Plan 1 (Cmty.
Corr. P’ship Alameda Cnty 2011). This is achieved largely through transferring responsibility for
incarceration and supervision of many low-level inmates and parolees from the California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation to the county level. Id.; see also Joan Petersilia, California Prison
Downsizing and Its Impact on Local Criminal Justice Systems, 8 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 327, 332 (2014).

120. See Petersilia, supra note 119, at 328; see also Anjuli Verma, The Law-Before: Legacies and Gaps in Penal

Reform, 49 L. & Soc’y Rev. 847, 848 (2015); Mia Bird & Ryken Grattet, Realignment and Recidivism,
664 ANNALS Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 176, 177 (2016) (citing Michael Santos, California’s
Realignment: Real Prison Reform or Shell Game?, HuffPost, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/californiaprison-realignment_b_2841392 (May 11, 2013)).

193

LAW AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA

inequality.121 Yet, an article produced as part of a 2014 symposium suggests that the
California Experiment may offer hope of meaningful decarceration.122 Documenting
how these efforts unfold will remain a ripe vein for future scholarship.
B. The Politics of the Census

Debates among demographers have long turned on how to count non-white
populations, especially population enumeration required for each decennial census.123
As recent research shows, the unit of analysis used by the U.S. Census Bureau to
count employment and housing among other demographic patterns has important
race-related implications, and these designs have changed significantly over time.124
Any method of enumeration that undercounts Black Americans affects not only each
state’s representation in Congress (the principal purpose for the constitutional
requirement of a periodic census),125 but also affects formulas used to allocate federal
tax dollars to states for housing, health, education, and other programs that may
provide disproportionate benefits to Black Americans and poor households generally.
The Census Bureau’s decision to omit prison inmates in the analysis of employment
and housing is a particularly important illustration.126 Mass incarceration eroded
many of the gains that had been made toward racial workplace integration and, by
omitting inmates from the number of unemployed, “conventional labor force statistics
significantly overestimate[d] the labor force involvement of [Black American] men,
and young [B]lack men in particular.”127 Similarly, by omitting prison populations,
census data does not document the expansion of the criminal justice system post1970s and its impact on the residence of large proportions of young Black men.
According to this analysis, taking incarceration into account significantly expands the
121. Caught, supra note 114, at 20.
122. See Bird & Grattet, supra note 120, at 177 (examining recidivism outcomes following delegations of

authority over certain offenses to local officials); Symposium, The Great Experiment: Realigning Criminal
Justice in California and Beyond, 664 ANNALS Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 4 (2016); see also Todd R.
Clear & Natasha A. Frost, The Punishment Imperative 9 (2014) (citing California’s efforts to
reduce prison populations).

123. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 2; see Our Censuses, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/programs-

surveys/censuses.html (Nov. 19, 2021).

124. See Kenneth Prewitt, What Is “Your” Race? 109 (2013) (noting “demographic analysis” as a

method used to undercount racial minorities). Bias in census taking was well illustrated by the Trump
administration’s efforts to add a question on citizenship, which seemed to many a thinly disguised effort
to discourage legal immigrant voters. See Nicole Narea, Trump’s Obstruction of the 2020 Census, Explained,
Ctr. for Pub. Integrity (Oct. 9, 2020), https://publicintegrity.org/politics/system-failure/trumpobstruction-of-2020-census/. Efforts to communicate a different intent were impeded by the Trump
administration’s decision to end the count early, in the middle of a global pandemic. Id.

125. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
126. Becky Pettit & Bryan L. Sykes, Civil Rights Legislation and Legalized Exclusion: Mass Incarceration and

the Masking of Inequality, 30 Socio. F. 589, 600 (2015).

127. Id.
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degree of “hypersegregation” in American society.128 Not only does prison exclude
individuals from census tabulations, but it also has consequences for employment
post-release,129 and for voting,130 health,131 and jury service.132
C. Incarceration: A Mechanism of Stratification with Collateral Consequences

Although education and employment are typically considered the most important
determinants of mobility, social status, and labor force participation, today, mass
incarceration and its disproportionate impact on Black Americans and Hispanics
should also be treated as a mechanism determinative of mobility.133 Mass incarceration
has wide-ranging collateral consequences for individual social mobility and the wellbeing of family members and children. The effects of imprisonment of an individual
on their partner and children has been termed “secondary prisonization.”134 These
“legal bystanders” often undergo a Kafkaesque process to see their partner or parent:
Compliance with rules and regulations and undergoing checks and re-checks through
a bureaucratic maze are required before an often very short visit.135 These collateral
burdens in time lost at work, plus the cost of travel, amount to an additional form of
punishment.136
128. The term “hypersegregation” has been defined as a condition occurring “when a race/ethnic group is

highly segregated in multiple ways, no matter how segregation is conceptualized or measured.” Nancy
A. Denton, Hypersegregation, in Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology 2196 (George Ritzer ed.,
2007).

129. Devah Pager, Marked 58, 65–66 (2007); see also Devah Pager et al., Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers

to Employment Facing Young Black and White Men with Criminal Records, 623 ANNALS Am. Acad.
Pol. & Soc. Sci. 195, 195–98, 209 (2009).

130. Jeff Manza et al., Locked Out 165–67, 170–78 (2006).
131. See generally Michael Massoglia, Incarceration, Health, and Racial Disparities in Health, 42 Law & Soc’y

Rev. 275 (2008).

[R]acial differences in health . . . become nonsignificant when exposure to incarceration
is considered. . . . [But] even if the effect of incarceration on later health is the same
across races, the impact will be greater on the aggregate health of minorities because
minorities are considerably more likely to be exposed to the detrimental health effects
of incarceration.

Id. at 292.

132. See James M. Binnall, Sixteen Million Angry Men: Reviving a Dead Doctrine to Challenge the

Constitutionality of Excluding Felons from Jury Service, 17 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 1, 15–17 (2009).

133. See Sara Wakefield & Christopher Uggen, Incarceration and Stratification, 36 Ann. Rev. Socio. 387,

393 (2010); see also Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime 5 (2016)
(providing a more recent analysis of mass incarceration’s disproportionate impact).

134. Megan Comfort, Doing Time Together 14–15 (2008).
135. See Alice Goffman, On the Run 224 (2014) (noting the long hours waited by loved ones visiting

inmates).

136. See generally Malcolm Feeley, The Process is the Punishment 201 (1992) (“If the stigma of the

criminal sanction is not viewed as a significant sanction, the concrete costs of the pretrial process take
on great significance. When this occurs, the process itself becomes the punishment.”).
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Another collateral consequence of mass incarceration among Black American
men is the increased risk of housing eviction of their female counterparts and family
members.137 In poor, predominantly Black neighborhoods, women are more likely to
hold a lease, in part because of their male partners’ past criminal record or current
incarceration.138 Also in these poor neighborhoods, women are more likely to be
evicted than men, and the overall eviction rate is higher than it is for men or women
in predominantly white neighborhoods.139 Research documents the manner in which
racial hierarchy is systematically reproduced in interactions between landlords and
their Black female renters when the rent cannot be paid or the landlord fails to make
a repair.140
Institutionalization of mass incarceration also has consequences for child wellbeing.141 Initially, one might assume that removing a parent who has committed a
crime has a beneficial effect on a child’s homelife and upbringing. And before the
prison boom of the 1970s, incarceration of a father was relatively rare.142 Today,
however, more criminal laws, more frequent incarceration of the mentally ill, and
“three strikes” sentencing guidelines,143 among other factors, have transformed that
probability into a “common [reality] for recent generations of [B]lack children—
especially those whose fathers dropped out of high school.”144 Incarceration of Black
American fathers significantly increases the odds that their offspring have serious
mental health and behavioral problems, infant mortality, and homelessness.145 Each
137. Matthew Desmond, Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118 Am. J. Socio. 88, 91 (2012) (“If

incarceration has become typical in the lives of men from impoverished [B]lack neighborhoods, eviction
has become typical in the lives of women from these neighborhoods.”).

138. Id. at 105 (detailing the common dilemma facing Black women, namely, that Black women are more

likely to be named on their household’s lease but less likely to make ends meet as compared to their male
counterparts).

139. Id. at 98; see also, e.g., Matthew Desmond, MacArthur Found., Poor Black Women Are Evicted

at Alarming Rates, Setting Off a Chain of Hardship 2 (2014) (“In high-poverty [B]lack
[Milwaukee] neighborhoods, one male renter in 33 and one woman in 17 is evicted. In high-poverty
white [Milwaukee] neighborhoods, in contrast, the ratio is 134:1 for men and 150:1 for women.”).

140. See Matthew Desmond, Evicted 53–55 (2016) (illustrating the typical Black-woman/landlord

relationship).

141. See generally Children of Prison Boom, supra note 27, at 131; Holly Foster & John Hagan, Maternal

and Paternal Imprisonment and Children’s Social Exclusion in Young Adulthood, 105 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 387, 390, 423 (2015) (finding lower socioeconomic status of children with incarcerated
parents); Bryan L. Sykes & Becky Pettit, Severe Deprivation and System Inclusion Among Children of
Incarcerated Parents in the United States After the Great Recession, 1 RSF: Russell Sage Found. J. Soc.
Scis. 108, 110 (2015) (describing behavioral and social challenges facing children of incarcerated parents).

142. See Kristin Turney & Rebecca Goodsell, Parental Incarceration and Children’s Wellbeing, 28 Future of

Child. 147, 148 (2018) (reporting that incarceration affected roughly 161 of every one hundred
thousand adults in the 1970s).

143. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1) (mandating a life sentence for a person convicted of a serious felony if he or she

has two or more other felonies or drug offenses of a certain kind).

144. King & Smith 2008, supra note 51, at 341.
145. See Children of Prison Boom, supra note 27, at 131.
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of these factors has long-term consequences for success as an adult. In a sobering
note, authors Sara Wakefield and Christopher Wildeman conclude that “parental
imprisonment is a distinctively American force for promoting intergenerational social
inequality in the same league with decaying, urban public-school systems and highly
concentrated disadvantage in urban centers that distinctively touch—and
disadvantage—poor [B]lack children.”146
V.	TRANSLATING THE LAW ON THE BOOKS TO THE LAW IN ACTION: THE CASE
OF TITLE VII

Judicial and legislative achievements of the civil rights movement present ripe
sites for explaining the steps taken to institutionalize the goals embodied in rulings
and statutes, from the institutionalization of K–12 school desegregation to affirmative
action in higher education to housing and employment. Part V reviews one
particularly rich site—employment—where law and social science scholars have
made particularly important contributions to our understanding.147 While this
literature is intrinsically important for what it demonstrates about scholarly debate
around whether and to what extent the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and specifically
Title VII, has achieved its goal, it also illustrates a more general point, namely, that
the law in action is often more telling than the law on the books.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, barring discrimination in employment, is
remarkably ambiguous in its wording and provides little guidance on implementation
or on evaluating compliance.148 Title VII has had an impact on the organization and
management of the contemporary workplace, becoming a pivotal focus of human
resources (HR) management.149 Professional HR managers have, over time,
developed corporate standards for affirmative action in hiring, training, work
assignment, and later, diversity and inclusion programs (for example, mentoring and
networking initiatives).150 Two points are worth noting. First, HR experts “peddled”
146. Id. at 157.
147. For another particularly important example of racial bias in policy implementation—specifically, in the

implementation of special education policies under federal legislation—see Richard D. Marsico, The
Intersection of Race and Special Education: The Role of Structural Inequities in the IDEA, 66 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. 207 (2021–2022).

148. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17; see Frank Dobbin, Inventing

Equal Opportunity 220–24 (2009) (discussing programs designed by corporate personnel to
supplement Title VII’s shortcomings); see also Legal Ambiguity, supra note 52, at 1536–37 (contending
that Title VII’s broad and ambiguous language undermines corporate antidiscrimination policies); see
also From Legal Doctrine to Social Transformation?, supra note 52.

149. Charles R. Epp, Making Rights Real 1 (2009) (noting strategies used by activists and professionals

to institutionalize the objectives of Title VII); see also Dobbin, supra note 148, at 101–02 (same).

150. See Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management, 41 Am. Behav.

Scientist 960, 965, 969, 972–83, 978–79 (1998). Building on a post-New Deal model of managerial
labor-management relations (excluding union participation in favor of management prerogative to control
of labor conditions), the field of HR expertise became the corporate site for devising policies and practices
designed to address what was in its earliest iteration referred to as affirmative action. See id. at 969.
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their programs in prominent business journals,151 and though changes in HR best
practices “happened piecemeal, by the beginning of the new century, they had
revolutionized the employment relationship.”152 Second, research shows that the
threat of lawsuits by individuals and the government casts a shadow that keeps
everyone on the HR innovation bandwagon, though often with little attention to
assessing its overall effectiveness.153
Pathbreaking research organized in Professor Lauren Edelman’s Working Law
examined why implementation of federal legal mandates under the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act (EEO)154 in the workplace155 has failed to mitigate
racial and gender discrimination. Her research demonstrates that expertise in law
and management have blurred to the point where the law is, in essence, little more
than an extension of management’s interpretation of it, a process termed
“endogeneity.”156 As used in analysis of that context, and borrowed subsequently by
other scholars who apply it more generally to enforce policy, “endogeneity” refers to
the outcome of relying on experts within the regulated group to control law’s
meaning. No longer an expression of commitment to rights and a rule of law, Title
VII’s requirements have been reframed by HR professionals, many of whom are
employed by regulated companies, to implement equal opportunity within a
framework of objectives defined by management while putting law-like guidelines
and court-like practices in place to manage claims of racial (or gender) discrimination.
Most revealing, however, has been judicial deference to these practices.157 Federal
courts have held that workplace policies and procedures crafted by corporate EEO
professionals evidence compliance with the law, and in some cases, constitute an
affirmative defense to hostile work environment and harassment claims.158 Thus, the
federal courts have increasingly empowered company-employed experts to interpret
151. Dobbin, supra note 148, at 223 (“Rather than hiding their innovations from competing firms, personnel

experts peddled them in the pages of Fortune and Human Resources Management.”).

152. See id. at 224.
153. Id. at 232; see Master Theory, supra note 111.
154. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended in

scattered sections of 5 and 42 U.S.C.).

155. To view the “EEO is the Law” poster that employers must conspicuously display in the workplace, see

Equal Employment Opportunity is the Law, Employers, U.S. EEOC (Nov. 2009), https://www.eeoc.gov/
sites/default/files/migrated_files/employers/eeoc_self_print_poster.pdf.

156. Working Law, supra note 52.
157. Id. at 178–81.
158. Id. at 211–13; see, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72–73 (1986) (declining to “issue a

definitive rule on employer liability” but providing that “absence of notice to an employer does not
necessarily insulate that employer from liability”); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765
(1998) (noting that an employee’s failure to exercise reasonable care to “avoid harm” may be enough to
satisfy the second element of an employer’s affirmative defense against a Title VII claim); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (finding that an antiharassment policy may appropriately
satisfy the first element of the affirmative defense against a Title VII claim); Vance v. Ball State Univ.,
133 U.S. 421, 430 (2013) (explaining how an employer can mitigate or avoid liability).
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the law while limiting the scope of judicial interpretation. Pessimistically, Edelman
concludes, “we live not in a post-civil rights society but rather in a symbolic civil
rights society.”159
Other research finds that employment practices are guided by a market logic that
recognizes the pragmatics and usefulness of “racial realism,” or a “strategy of using
membership in a racial group as a qualification.”160 How “racial realism” plays out
depends on the employment sector and often on racial or ethnic stereotypes.
Employers in low-paying sectors prefer stereotypically “hardworking” immigrants to
native-born white or Black Americans.161 Employers who hire doctors according to
race and ethnicity rely on research in medicine that suggests that racially concordant
doctor-patient matching has significant, positive effects on quality of health.162 These
institutionalized practices take place under the radar of formal law, and often without
legal challenge, with problematic consequences in less formal, more poorly
compensated sectors of the economy (for example, home care aides). As a result of
discriminatory “realism” in hiring that permeates the modern workplace yet operates
beside the law, one scholar concludes, “America’s civil rights laws have become, in
some very real and perhaps morally troubling sense, anachronisms.”163
These studies speak to the limits of the judiciary’s capacity to address a deeply
engrained legacy of institutionalized racial discrimination. Research on specific
professions, including medicine,164 law,165 and engineering,166 for example, consistently
corroborate the stalled pace of workplace integration along racial lines, particularly
in the upper echelons of these respective fields. We also note that recent research
looks closely at the specific design of civil rights and diversity policies that do and do

159. Working Law, supra note 52, at 216.
160. John David Skrentny, After Civil Rights 3 (2013).
161. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 105, at 176–79 (describing a Spanish-speaking immigrant who benefitted

from the “view that Latino immigrants are harder workers”).

162. King & Smith 2008, supra note 51, at 342; see also Skrentny, supra note 160, at 11 (discussing racial

matching in professional fields).

163. King & Smith 2008, supra note 51, at 342; see also Skrentny, supra note 160, at 266–67 (arguing that

racial realism in the workplace is unsupported by U.S. civil rights law).

164. See Skrentny, supra note 160, at 40–50.
165. See Monique R. Payne-Pikus et al., Experiencing Discrimination: Race and Retention in America’s Largest

Law Firms, 44 L. & Soc’y Rev. 553, 560–62 (2010) (theorizing that Big Law firms struggle to retain
Black lawyers, particularly at the associate level, because of disparities in partner contact and mentorship
opportunities).

166. See Angela Byars-Winston et al., Race/Ethnicity and Sex in U.S. Occupations, 1970–2010: Implications for

Research, Practice, and Policy, 87 J. Vocational Behav. 54, 65 (2015) (reporting little change in racial
diversity in STEM, and especially engineering, fields between the 1970s and 2010s); Liana Christin
Landivar, U.S. Census Bureau, Disparities in STEM Employment by Sex, Race, and Hispanic
Origin 15 (2013) (“[T]he average racial and ethnic distribution of the STEM workforce is 71 percent
non-Hispanic White, 15 percent Asian, 6 percent Black, and 7 percent Hispanic.”).
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not prove effective for ameliorating racial discrimination.167 How and to what extent
such findings inform future policymaking that is transformative remains, however,
an open question.
VI. LAW, SEGREGATION, AND CONCENTRATED DISADVANTAGE168

In the late 1970s, a seminal analysis of isolated, impoverished Black American
communities answered racial stereotyping and moral judgments by conservatives
who claimed that Black Americans themselves were responsible for the failure of
civil rights era anti-poverty programs.169 Evidence from large cities like Chicago
suggested that, while expressly discriminatory policies no longer accounted for the
lack of progress, profound restructuring of urban economies over the latter half of
the twentieth century gutted opportunity structures,170 contributing to continuing
isolation and exposure to concentrated disadvantage.171 In turn, concentrated
disadvantage had become an independent cause of deep poverty. Middle and
employed working class families tended to move, leaving behind neighborhoods
virtually devoid of role models of upward mobility, community-based institutions,
and opportunities for education and employment.172 The impact of continuing de
facto segregation, especially the so-called “neighborhood effects” of segregation on
an individual’s opportunities, motivations, and choices, explained persistence of
concentrated disadvantage over recent generations. Segregation, prominent scholars
167. See Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, Enforcement of Civil Rights Law in Private Workplaces: The Effects

of Compliance Reviews and Lawsuits Over Time, 31 L. & Soc. Inquiry 855, 883 (2006) (“[L]awsuits and
compliance reviews had significant positive effects on the subsequent share of white women, [B]lack
women, and [B]lack men in management.”); Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, Best Practices or Best
Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 Am. Socio. Rev.
589, 590 (2006) (finding that white women benefit more than Black women, who benefit more than
Black men, from corporate affirmative action programs, diversity training programs, and mentorship
and networking programs).

168. For a closer look at disadvantages flowing from housing and land use policies, see Richard Chused,

Strategic Thinking About Racism in American Zoning, 66 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 307 (2021–2022).

169. William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged 16, 62, 132 (1987) (citing increased poverty

and unemployment as variables that undermined civil rights law and anti-poverty programs).

170. This restructuring included gutting access to jobs, better education, and paths out of poverty for

minority groups, and creating policies to, for example, relocate industries to remote locations and place
low-income housing in poorer neighborhoods. Id. at 135.

171. Id. at 136. Collaborators of author William Julius Wilson have argued that disadvantages experienced

by Black Americans—measured by multiple indicators including poverty, unemployment, femaleheaded households, welfare receipt, density of children, and underfunding of critical public and private
sector institutions—are often simultaneously present in Black-majority neighborhoods, amounting to a
“concentrated disadvantage.” Id. at 58. Such concentrated disadvantage leads to qualitatively different
community life, special barriers to advancement, and enduring inequality. Id. at 60; see also Robert J.
Sampson, Great American City 20 (2012) [hereinafter Great American City] (citing concentrated
disadvantage as a factor contributing to community violence).

172. The mobility of more well-to-do families is one element of Wilson’s argument. Wilson, supra note 169,

at 50, 55–56; see also Elijah Anderson, Code of the Street 145 (1999) (depicting the exodus of
working-class families from neighborhoods riddled with poverty).
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concluded, is responsible for “enabling all other forms of racial oppression” in a
process that “binds them together into a coherent and uniquely effective system of
racial subordination,” making racial segregation and its institutional form, the Black
ghetto, “the key structural factors responsible for the perpetuation of Black poverty
in the United States.”173
Historical analysis shows that the “evolution of segregated, all-[B]lack
neighborhoods . . . was not the result of impersonal market forces,” but an entity
“constructed through a series of well-defined institutional practices, private behaviors,
and public policies by which whites sought to contain growing urban Black
populations.”174 Segregated neighborhoods have deep roots in employment, and
education and housing subsidies offered by the New Deal to whites were largely
denied to Black Americans. A legislative coalition anchored by southern Democrats
and moderates acting on behalf of ambivalent white constituents weakened
enforcement provisions of the 1968 Fair Housing Act (FHA). More effective
enforcement made possible by 1988 revisions was undermined initially by presidential
opposition during the end of the Reagan administration, local resistance, and more
recently, Supreme Court hostility to civil rights litigation.175
Likewise, local zoning and development policies ref lect strong pressure to
separate, rather than integrate, Black Americans.176 National and local civil rights
policies forbidding racial steering by brokers and redlining by mortgage lenders are
poorly enforced.177 Policy failures are consistent with the views of large constituencies:
Survey data continue to show that, while Black Americans remain the group most
open to living in an interracial community, they are considered the least desirable
neighbors by Hispanics and whites as well as better-off Black Americans.178
Ironically, effective interventions exist. A test of a theory similar to William
Julius Wilson’s “neighborhood effects” hypothesis was already underway when
Wilson wrote;179 that test came in the form of a court-ordered remedy for racial
173. Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid 8–9 (1993).
174. Id. at 10.
175. See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 389–92 (2012) (exhibiting hostility to § 1983 suits by

“[a]ffording immunity not only to public employees but also to others acting on behalf of the government
. . . to ensure that [they] are not deterred [from acting] by the threat of damages”); Minneci v. Pollard,
565 U.S. 118, 120, 131 (2012) (deflecting to state tort law on a federal prisoner’s claim for damages);
From Legal Doctrine to Social Transformation?, supra note 52, at 120–23.

176. See Sharkey, supra note 28, at 61–62, 111–12.
177. See generally Robert G. Schwemm & Jeffrey L. Taren, Discretionary Pricing, Mortgage Discrimination,

and the Fair Housing Act, 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 375, 427 n.268 (2010) (citing Sam Roberts,
Westchester County Agrees to Desegregate Housing in Mostly White Towns, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 2009, at
A14) (noting the necessary role of private enforcement to prevent FHA violations); Carolyn Bond &
Richard Williams, Residential Segregation and the Transformation of Home Mortgage Lending, 86 Soc.
Forces 671, 673 (2007).

178. Bobo & Charles, supra note 77, at 250; see also Rachael A. Woldoff, White Flight/Black Flight

12–13 (2011).

179. Wilson, supra note 169, at 144.
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discrimination by the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA).180 In a decision concerning
the remedy for the CHA’s discriminatory practice of placing new low-income housing
primarily in the city’s majority Black neighborhoods, the Supreme Court authorized
remedial action employing housing vouchers which could be used anywhere
throughout the metropolitan area including Chicago’s predominantly white
suburbs.181 Although results were initially disputed, re-analysis and subsequent
research discovered positive “neighborhood effects” from moving to a low poverty
neighborhood, including “massive” improvements in health and neighborhood
safety.182 A subsequent replication of the initial experiment with improved design
found strong positive effects on employment, earnings, and household income.183
The initially controversial hypothesis about the causes of isolation—that the
residents of isolated neighborhoods contribute to the reproduction of concentrated
disadvantage and inequality—has proven a fruitful source of insight into the racially
unequal impact of discriminatory policies, among them crime control and housing.
Individual behavior is linked to neighborhood “capital,” namely, social and economic
resources that influence an individual’s development, knowledge of the world, and
opportunities for mobility and their understanding of how to use these resources. In
turn, neighborhood “capital” is dependent upon urban structure and policy through
mediating processes such as neighborhood social interaction, perceptions of
neighborhood disorder, and collective capacity for informal social control,
neighborhood institutional resources, and the spatial organization of land use.184
180. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 288, 299 (1976) (“The relevant geographic area for purposes of

[public] housing options is the Chicago housing market, not the Chicago city limits.”).

181. Id.
182. See Susan Clampet-Lundquist & Douglas S. Massey, Neighborhood Effects on Economic Self-Sufficiency: A

Reconsideration of the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 114 Am. J. Socio. 107, 112 (2008) (correlating
socioeconomic benefits with low-poverty living); see also Robert J. Sampson, Moving to Inequality:
Neighborhood Effects and Experiments Meet Social Structure, 114 Am. J. Socio. 189 passim (2008)
[hereinafter Moving to Inequality] (testing the neighborhood effects theory); Jens Ludwig, Guest Editor’s
Introduction, 14 Cityscape, no. 2, 2012, at 1, 18–19 (reporting that the “Moving to Opportunity”
(MTO) social experiment, through which some families in public housing had an opportunity to
relocate to lower poverty neighborhoods, positively impacted the health of those families).

183. See Rebecca Casciano & Douglas S. Massey, Neighborhood Disorder and Individual Economic Self-

Sufficiency: New Evidence from a Quasi-Experimental Study, 18 Health & Place 180, 197–99 (2012).
Another effect of neighborhood isolation is that it creates a barrier to opportunities to move to better
neighborhoods. Id. An unexpected outcome of voucher programs tied to moving, such as the MTO
experiment, was that some recipients gave priority to neighborhoods in which they felt comfortable,
rather than neighborhoods where they might maximize opportunities valued by those conducting the
experiment. Id. Because such choices often returned individuals to relatively low-income neighborhoods
with high crime, the researchers dubbed these choices “moving to inequality.” Moving to Inequality,
supra note 182, at 213, 226.

184. See Stuart M. Butler & Jonathan Grabinsky, Tackling the Legacy of Persistent Urban Inequality and

Concentrated Poverty, Brookings (Nov. 16, 2020), https://w w w.brook ings.edu / blog/
up-front/2020/11/16/tackling-the-legacy-of-persistent-urban-inequality-and-concentrated-poverty
(“Promoting regional initiatives aimed at increasing the connectivity and mobility of urban residents,
and connecting communities to regional assets and opportunities, mak[e] it easier for people in different
communities to interact.”); see also Great American City, supra note 171, at 38–39; Christopher
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Concentrated disadvantage has been shown to have an effect on income, employment,
education, and exposure to concentrated disadvantage in the next generation,
independent of a parent’s status with respect to each measure.185
Further, “neighborhood effects” influence patterns of policing and their impact.
“Broken windows” policing concentrates on punishing perpetrators of minor
infractions on the theory that, if unchecked, the offenders will not only commit
crimes of increasing seriousness but also create the appearance of disorder (for
example, broken windows) in the relevant neighborhood, suggesting neglect and
lawlessness welcoming of further violations.186 Questioning the theory’s premise,
namely, that disorder leads to escalating crime and warrants more comprehensive
enforcement of quality-of-life infractions, Wilson’s collaborators have shown that any
direct link between actual neighborhood disorder (for example, broken windows) and
crime is quite weak.187 By contrast, collectively shared perceptions of disorder can have
important consequences, including neighborhood disinvestment or out-migration.188
For example, perceptions of disorder correlate with areas of concentrated minority
and impoverished populations, rather than actual disorder. Ironically, perceptions of
disorder rather than actual disorder also predict future levels of crime, a selfperpetuating cause of further isolation and crime which is suggested to be “one of the
underappreciated causes of continued racial [and economic] segregation in the United
States [and perhaps elsewhere].”189 Police presence, arbitrary stop and frisk, and
frequent arrests likewise contribute to “high levels of intersubjectively shared
cynicism and perceived irrelevance of legal rules” correlated with higher levels of
violence and lower readiness for civic participation.190 Counterintuitively, greater
police presence and more arrests may also lead to adverse perceptions of a
neighborhood’s social order and an increase in crime.191
Jencks & Susan E. Mayer, The Social Consequences of Growing Up in a Poor Neighborhood, in Inner-City
Poverty in the United States 111, 113–15 (Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., & Michael G.H. McGeary eds.,
1990) (delineating the benefits of “advantaged neighbors”).
185. See Sharkey, supra note 28, at 156–64.
186. See generally Charlotte Ruhl, The Broken Windows Theory, Simply Psych. (July 26, 2021), https://www.

simplypsychology.org/broken-windows-theory.html (citing George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson,
Broken Windows, The Atlantic (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/
broken-windows/304465/) (“[V]isible signs of crime and civil disorder, such as broken windows . . .
create an urban environment that promotes even more crime and disorder.”).

187. See Jeffrey D. Morenoff et al., Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of

Urban Violence, 39 Criminology 517, 519–20 (2001).

188. See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social

Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 Soc. Psych. Q. 319, 322, 337 (2004) [hereinafter Seeing Disorder].

189. Id. at 337.
190. See Great American City, supra note 171, at 366.
191. See Seeing Disorder, supra note 188, at 319 (“[R]esidents read signs of disorder as evidence of a deeper

neighborhood malaise.”). But see Zusha Elinson et al., Cities Reverse Defunding the Police Amid Rising
Crime, WSJ (May 26, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cities-reverse-defunding-the-police-amidrising-crime-11622066307; As Violent Crime Leaps, Liberal Cities Rethink Cutting Police Budgets, The
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These and similar findings over many years of research show that racial inequality
arises from multigenerational exposure to concentrated disadvantage. On the basis of
this research, one scholar concludes that “[t]he social structure of urban America is
such that absent forceful intervention, powerful, institutionalized, socially-embedded
processes will operate to replicate the existing ecological landscape.”192 Mediating
structures, including social policies, law enforcement, and institutions outside the
ghetto play an indirect role in creating “persistent cultural mechanisms” constituting
a “deep structure” reproducing racial inequality.193
VII. CONCLUSION

This essay originated during the political turmoil of the 2020 presidential
election. Its themes resonate with hotly contested and divisive debates over domestic
policy that have not abated.194 Political conflict made race a forceful issue, creating
momentum for racial reckoning and an opportunity to address longstanding patterns
of the racial inequality that we have described here. Since we began, backlash against
efforts to bring about change has grown in some sectors of American society.195
Racial minorities continue to face unequal challenges, including disproportionate
incarceration and its collateral consequences for child and family well-being. There
are parallel inequalities in employment, education, health, and housing. It is worth
quoting the Supreme Court’s sadly misinformed decision in Shelby County, striking
down a key enforcement provision of the VRA while claiming “that the conditions
that originally justified [section 4(b)] no longer characterize voting in the covered

Economist (Jan. 15, 2022), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2022/01/15/as-violent-crimeleaps-liberal-cities-rethink-cutting-police-budgets.
192. Douglas S. Massey, Inheritance of Poverty or Inheritance of Place? The Emerging Consensus on Neighborhoods

and Stratification, 42 Contemp. Socio. 690, 693 (2013).

193. Id.
194. The 2016 and 2020 election cycles generated extraordinary and bitter contention not only over race and

policies with a racial impact but also manipulation of racially coded discourse with divisive effects on
the public. See, e.g., Simon Clark, Ctr. for Am. Progress, How White Supremacy Returned to
Mainstream Politics 7, 10 (2020) (highlighting vague catchphrases used by far-right commentators
to take white nationalism mainstream); Jack Holland & Ben Fermor, The Discursive Hegemony of Trump’s
Jacksonian Populism: Race, Class, and Gender in Constructions and Contestations of US National Identity,
2016–2018, 41 Pol. 64, 75–76 (2020) (noting how President Trump’s rhetoric embraced the workingclass white male as the identity and backbone of the nation).

195. See, e.g., The Brookings Cafeteria, Charlottesville: One Year Later, Brookings (Aug. 3, 2018), https://

www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/charlottesville-one-year-later/ (Charlottesville protest); Emmitt
Y. Riley & Clarissa Peterson, I Can’t Breathe: Assessing the Role of Racial Resentment and Racial Prejudice
in Whites’ Feelings toward Black Lives Matter, 1 Nat’l Rev. Black Pol. 496, 497–99 (2020) (“all lives
matter” and “blue lives matter” demonstrations); Esther Schrader, BLM Backlash: The Nation’s Racial
Reckoning Meets Bitter Resistance at a High School in Florida Named for a Confederate Leader, S. Poverty
L. Ctr. (May 21, 2021), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2021/05/21/blm-backlash-nations-racialreckoning-meets-bitter-resistance-high-school-f lorida-named (removing BLM banner from high
school classroom).
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jurisdictions.”196 In many respects, the Court had already rendered similar judgments
about the need for policies addressing racial inequality in other areas,197 tracking
beliefs held by the American public.198 Notwithstanding the Court’s opinion, we
observe that, in the aftermath of Shelby County, a number of states, especially in the
South, have recently imposed state-level requirements restricting access to the voting
booth that disproportionately affect minority constituents.199
The scholarship reviewed here paints a portrait of inequality in the United States
that is dramatically different from the Court’s characterization in Shelby County.
Indeed, the scholarship reviewed here shows significant setbacks beginning in the
1980s in America’s aspiration to achieve a more egalitarian, integrated, fair, and
equitable society. The generation inspired by the civil rights movement asked tough
questions and brought rigor, depth, sophistication, and insight to an analysis of its
legacy. Emerging scholars in law and social science continue to build on a remarkably
solid foundation of scholarship. Thus, during the most racially divisive period in our
memory, we face the challenge of remaining optimistic about our role as scholars of
law and social science in overcoming a legacy of structural inequality along lines of
race and class. We take solace in the words of Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.: “The arc
of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”200 At this dark moment in
our nation’s history, we do not have the luxury to sit back because, simply put, it is
too important to keep pushing that bend toward justice.
In closing, we encourage our colleagues and students to take concrete and
pragmatic steps to act on research documenting the persistence of racial inequality.
And if our mission as teachers and scholars is to set the record straight so that
something can be done to create a more just society, then we must convey an accurate
understanding of this long-existing problem to future generations of legal
practitioners, policymakers, legislators, and members of the judiciary as well as the
public, urging them to seek remedies and deeper understanding.

196. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 535 (2013); see Morgan Kousser, Do the Facts of Voting Rights

Support Chief Justice Roberts’s Opinion in Shelby County?, 1 Transatlantica 2, 8 (2015). The Court
cited state-imposed literacy tests and other devices designed to suppress minority voter registration,
turnout, and the election of Black officials as “conditions that [were] originally justified” but have since
been eradicated through section 4(b)’s enactment. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 547, 551; see also Cong.
Rsch. Serv., IF11908, Voting Rights Act and H.R. 4 (117th Congress): An Overview 1 (2021).

197. See supra Part IV.
198. See supra Part II.
199. See Theodore R. Johnson & Max Feldman, The New Voter Suppression, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (Jan.

16, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/new-voter-suppression; see also
Voter ID Chronology, supra note 23.

200. Remaining Awake Through a Great Revolution, National Cathedral, Martin Luther King, Jr. (Mar. 31,

1968) (accessed using Spotify); see also Penelope Andrews, A Commission on Recognition and Reconstruction
for the United States: Illusory or Inspirational?, 66 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 359 (2021–2022).
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